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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
GATT AND RECENT INTERNATIONAL TRADE PROBLEMS*
JOHN H. JACKSON**
This fall (1986) has been a particularly exciting time for interna-
tional trade and international trade law. We have had not only massive
media coverage of the GATT negotiations in Punta del Este but all
year long we have had a festering question of a large trade bill in Con-
gress. Additionally, there have been a number of major unfair trade
cases pending. International trade is a subject that has many esoteric
features and it is not easy to understand. The topic has many oddities,
some of which I want to address.
I.
First, I turn to the meeting in Punta del Este, Uruguay, in Sep-
tember 1986 which was the launching session, the so-called ministerial
meeting of the GATT contracting parties. By ministerial, they mean a
meeting at the level of ministers, and in fact the United States had
three cabinet level ministers at that meeting as well as a whole group
of sub-cabinet level offices and a number of other delegation members.
Interestingly enough there were also ten persons from the private sec-
tor, including the chief executive officers of important companies deal-
ing in international trade. This was a very large delegation from the
United States and similarly from ninety or so other countries around
the world. Potentially more than one hundred countries may ultimately
participate in this negotiation. The purpose of this meeting was to
launch the eighth round of the trade negotiations which will carry on
for many years. The declaration specifies four years but I think the
better predictions are ten years, and that in itself poses a number of
issues. For example, this initiative now is going forward under the Rea-
gan Administration, but clearly by the time it is completed we will
have been through several administrations, possibly a change in party
at the executive level. The question arises how do you manage interna-
tionally, from the point of view of the United States, a negotiation that
is going to span a number of different administrations, a greater num-
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ber of different congresses and potentially a totally different economic
climate.
The United States had five major points on its agenda for the
Punta del Este meeting. They relate to five subjects: that of agriculture,
of GATT dispute settlement, of services, of intellectual property and
finally of investment. I will deal very briefly with each of those. In
Washington, a number of relevant meetings took place during the week
of September 26, 1986 with returning members of the delegation.
There was an opportunity both from these meetings and from the press
reports, as well as from the full text of the Punta del Este Declaration
to begin to appraise what happened there. Each of the items on the
U.S. agenda had a certain series of problems. There was, of course, a
preparatory draft, a draft declaration that had been worked out with
international negotiations over a year. Some matters in this draft decla-
ration were in what diplomats call "square brackets", that is they were
not completely decided upon. In other matters there were important
dissenters.
Agriculture topped this list, not necessarily because of long-term
priorities, but because of short-term political problems. The subject of
agriculture has been very, very difficult for GATT throughout its his-
tory. The disciplines of GATT legally do apply to agricultural goods
but in practice they have tended not to apply. The whole area of agri-
culture trade in the world has, for one reason or another, largely es-
caped the discipline of GATT.
The United States went into the last round, the Tokyo Round, in-
tent on bringing agriculture into the GATT processes and largely
failed. Indeed the initial ministerial meeting to launch that round was
held in Tokyo in September, 1973 and I think when you compare what
happened in September, 1986 at Punta del Este, one can see how much
better the .United States has fared this time. At Punta del Este the
United States was intent on ensuring that agriculture was on the
agenda, that all aspects of agriculture could be negotiated as part of
GATT and to be sure that the processes that were set up for the nego-
tiation would not undermine the potential to discuss agriculture. All of
this is potential, there is no agreement yet. U.S. efforts aimed at guar-
anteeing that there would be talks about agriculture, and agricultural
goods were quite successful. The language of the Punta del Este decla-
ration largely permits this.
The GATT institutional structure has been criticized. Some argue
that the GATT processes are greatly defective, particularly GATT's
dispute settlement processes. The issue was in the draft declaration but
apparently was not debated extensively at Punta del Este. Hence, the
United States was able to obtain satisfactory language in the declara-
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tion. Do not be fooled, however, by the fact that it looks so easy be-
cause there are some really tough disagreements in the GATT about
what the GATT should be as an institution and what the dispute settle-
ment processes should be.
Services are one of the new issues for GATT. Services are a
polygot series of activities becoming increasingly important in world
trade as well as in industrial economies. They include insurance, bank-
ing, engineering services, legal services, medical services, basically, the
intangibles part of world trade. Services have grown in percentage of
world trade but are still a relatively small percentage, about 20 per-
cent. However, for certain economies, like that of the United States,
services represent a higher percentage of the gross national product
than the production of goods. Thus, services are obviously part of the
wave of the future. We as professors are all engaged in services; much
of the computer world is services. Some five or six years ago the United
States began pushing to bring some kind of an international discipline
to the subject of services. There virtually is none now. Certain areas of
service activity have specialized international organizations or treaties
that deal with them, but there is no general discipline on services trade.
As a result many countries are beginning to discover ways to keep out
the foreigner, to keep out the foreign banks, to keep out the foreign
insurance companies, and so on. Of course, the economic principles of
liberal trade whereby competition helps world welfare, where we want
competition from all nations, would suggest that for services, just as for
goods, it would be wise not to permit governments to erect these artifi-
cial barriers. The United States was very intent that we begin to have
some kind of an international discipline on services and therefore, it
said, let us put services in the GATT. This has been bitterly opposed by
a number of developing countries, spear-headed primarily by Brazil
and India, but in a number of other countries as well. Initially services
were opposed by the European common market countries. It was only
after the European nations did some of their homework and suddenly
realized what a large percentage of their own economy services repre-
sented and what potential for exporting services existed that the Euro-
pean economic community decided that services ought to be addressed
by GATT.
The result in Punta del Este regarding services was not unequivo-
cal. There was a certain amount of diplomatic "papering over" differ-
ences. Those countries that oppose services being brought into the fold
of the GATT were worried that the countries that had great economic
weight and power in trade and goods, would be able to use that power
in a way linked to services in order to get meaningful norms in interna-
tional service trade that would tend to favor the powerful nations and
19871
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disfavor the less fortunate, less powerful countries. Furthermore, many
of the countries, particularly the developing countries, argued that the
GATT has enough work to do and that it is not wise to divert its atten-
tion from goods questions such as agriculture. Thus, there were a vari-
ety of reasons behind the opposition to putting services in GATT and
that issue has not been fully resolved.
The Punta del Este declaration set up two negotiating groups. One
for services and one for all others. Both of those groups report to a
higher group called the Trade Negotiating Committee, which is the
traditional committee that is set up to service and to supervise negotia-
tions in the GATT. The group which is for all non-service areas is a
group of the contracting parties, the GATT Members, and the other
participants in the GATT Negotiation. The other group is a group of
the ministers of each of the countries and so in a sense, they all wear
two hats. Some tend to feel that as time goes on, these differences will
tend to fade and people will become used to dealing with services in the
GATT. However, for now the issue is still open and it is an interesting
one.
The fourth issue on this list, intellectual property, is increasingly
important. The United States, in particular U.S. businessmen, have
been very annoyed by the piracy that has been going on in the world,
the copying of records, of books, of TV tapes, and computer programs
and computer engineering, and so forth. The argument is that if this
piracy and this counterfeiting can continue so easily it is going to in-
hibit research and development. It is going to reduce the incentive for
the advancement of these areas. As a matter of fact, these are the basic
arguments of patent and copyright laws. Therefore, the United States
contends, some kind of international discipline is needed and because
intellectual property deals intimately with goods, GATT is an appropri-
ate forum. That was accepted at Punta del Este.
Finally, there are investment questions. Investment questions are
very complex. For centuries there have been many various kinds of in-
ternational activity on investment questions such as compensation that
is owed when property is expropriated or taken. Many countries in
GATT opposed putting this heavy burden under the GATT umbrella.
A compromise resulted that limits the scope of the investment mea-
sures that will be discussed in GATT to those called TRIMs, Trade
Related Investment Measures. The investment issues that relate to
trade and goods will be discussed and there are many such issues be-
cause, after all, investment goes hand-in-hand with goods trade. Often
businesses must go abroad to do some of their production, they may
have to assemble abroad, or they may need to have at least agencies
abroad for selling and investing. There are a variety of other things too.
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One of the overall things that impressed me in the reports from
the Trade Round was that the United States decided consciously, as
part of its strategy, not to go to Punta del Este with the view to strong-
arming other parts of the world into its own view. Not that it could
because I suspect the days of pure strong-arming are over for the
United States. Of course the United States had plenty of negotiating
"chips", plenty of bargaining power and it could have leaned quite
heavily on countries such as India and Brazil. Nonetheless, the United
States decided not to do so too explicitly, although obviously some of it
was done. I think the United States decided to negotiate in such a way
that in the end there would be a meaningful consensus by all of the
countries, at least by all of the major players. From what I have read
and those I have talked to it seems that the United States feels that it
has achieved this goal and I think it was a significant achievement.
II.
At this point I want to turn to the GATT itself. I begin with the
historical background of GATT. I love to begin talks about GATT with
the following statement. Knowing that GATT is the major interna-
tional institution governing international trade in the market economies
and in the world today, it'is fun to say the GATT has never come into
force. And in fact that is true. The GATT - the General Agreement
of Tariffs and Trade - has never come into force. How could an inter-
national agreement, a provisional agreement, if you will, be so signifi-
cant and what is its legal affect? Well, that leads to a second statement
that is sort of a foundation of this subject. And that is, whatever the
GATT is today it was never intended to be that. It really is fundamen-
tal for understanding the GATT and understanding, for instance, why
the GATT is different from the International Monetary Fund or differ-
ent from the United Nations, to go back and examine the history of the
GATT.
At the end of World War II there was a great deal of effort to try
to develop a new set. of international institutions regarding economics
and perhaps the most important part of that was something called the
Bretton Woods Conference in 1944. At that conference the allied na-
tions of the world got together knowing that the United Nations char-
ter would come into force, but they also wanted to develop some inter-
national institutions that they hoped would avoid some of the problems
of the inter-war period - some of the problems that led to protection-
ism, to the Great Depression, and perhaps to the rise of Hitler and
Nazism on the continent. The Bretton Woods Conference was called
with a view to developing the charters of two important institutions.
The International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Re-
1987]
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construction and Development. That was the monetary side of the
problem. The other side of the issue was trade. You cannot really do
monetary matters without looking at trade and vice versa. Nonetheless
the Bretton Woods Conference did not deal with trade and herein lies
one of the worldwide problems, institutionally, about this subject.
There has always tended to be a bifurcation between monetary
and trade matters. You see it in the ministries of governments. The
Bretton Woods Conference was really under the sponsorship of the
Ministies of Finance, the Chancellors of the Exchequer, the Depart-
ments of the Treasury, and so on. Politically and bureaucratically the
negotiators did not have jurisdiction over trade. At home other minis-
tries, for example the Ministry of Commerce handled trade. In the
United States, at that particular time, the State Department and the
Department of Commerce, were fighting over who would get jurisdic-
tion. Thus, at Bretton Woods international trade issues were deferred.
Perhaps that is what led to the whole kettle of problems that we have
in the GATT.
Once the war was over, the good intentions of the various nations
began to falter. An attitude of returning to normalcy developed. The
pressure to design new international economic institutions lessened.
Trade was not given attention until after the United Nations was set up
and the Economic and Social Council called for a conference to develop
an international trade organization. By now it was late 1946, so pas-
sions had calmed and countries were also becoming bored or nervous
about initiatives. Nevertheless, as had been foreseen in the Bretton
Woods Conference, there was an initiative, spearheaded by the United
States but participated in by a number of other countries, to accom-
plish two things. One was the development of a charter for an Interna-
tional Trade Organization (ITO), and the other was the development
of a reciprocal tariff reduction agreement.
Those two initiatives pursued really two strands of history that
came together at that time. One of those strands which I have already
referred to in connection with the needs and desires for the Bretton
Woods Agreement was to prevent another war. This was a basic strand
frequently heard. You would hear it in the speeches of World War II
leaders. These leaders emphasized the need to set up institutions that
would prevent the problems that occurred in the 20 years before the
war and would prevent war itself.
The other strand, however, was a bit more prosaic and a bit more
pragmatic, but nevertheless, important. That is the strand that is em-
bodied in the United States' series of legislation for reciprocal trade
agreements which began in the early Roosevelt Administration, partic-
ularly in 1934. You may remember the disastrous tariff act passed by
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the United States Congress in 1930 called the Smoot-Hawley Act. This
tariff was very damaging to world trade, some would link it to the great
depression and therefore to Hitler and to World War II. That perhaps,
stretches the imagination a bit and historians argue about that. Never-
theless, there was probably some relationship between that Tariff Act
and some of the disasters that followed. In any event, during the early
Roosevelt Administration, Secretary of State, Cordell Hull approached
Congress proposing that Congress delegate to the U.S. President the
authority to enter into international agreements for a mutual and recip-
rocal reduction of tariffs. After the Congressional action pushing tariffs
way up in the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Act, the executive was now trying
to persuade Congress that the contrary was better, that trade should be
done reciprocally, by swapping deals to lower barriers.
Congress gave the President the requested authority. In fact, the
President's authority was two-part. First, the President was granted au-
thority to enter into the international agreement. It was a congressio-
nally pre-approved executive agreement. (It is one of five different
kinds of international agreements into which the United States Consti-
tution permits United States officials to enter.) The other part of the
authority given to the President was the authority to proclaim the re-
sults of the international agreement into domestic U.S. law, assuming
the international agreement was validly within the parameters set by
Congress. The President would be allowed to do both of those things
without returning to Congress. Congress granted this authority by en-
acting statutes. However, Congress would not give the authority for an
unlimited time. Instead, Congress always set a time limit, usually three
years in these statutes, and then the statutes would be renewed.
By the end of World War II in mid-1945, the United States had
negotiated about thirty bilateral, reciprocal trade agreements. Also in
1945, the statute granting the authority to negotiate these agreements
was renewed for a three year period. This development of reciprocal
mutual reduction of tariffs through an international agreement was a
policy that the United States Executive wanted to implement and was
the second strand of history to which I referred. The President obtained
congressional permission as well as a renewal of that permission.
Therefore, in 1946 with the notion to draft the ideal ITO charter, con-
ferences were also called to draft further reciprocal tariff reductions.
The only difference this time was that the treaties would be multilat-
eral instead of bilateral. Those two strands came together and we are
still living with the result today.
In Geneva in 1947, there was a major conference, what I have
called a three ring circus. One part of the conference was to negotiate
the charter for an international trade organization. Another part nego-
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tiated reciprocal tariff reductions, item by item, bilaterally but also
brought them together into a multilateral agreement. That is the
GATT, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. In the third ring
the so-called general language of the GATT that would be attached to
the tariff reduction agreement was negotiated.
Originally it was thought that there would be an ITO that would
be a supervising organization. The proposed charter contained mea-
sures for voting, for finances, for a secretariat - all of the usual orga-
nizational provisions. The GATT was simply to be appended to the
charter. The GATT was just an agreement, a contract if you will.
Indeed, early drafts of the GATT contained words about organiza-
tion. When the U.S. negotiators returned home and testified before
Congress, the Congress said that the negotiators did not have authority
to enter into a GATT with organizational clauses. Under the U.S. Con-
stitution, it was clear that the U.S. Executive would have to submit an
ITO Charter to the Congress. Because of the 1945 renewal of the recip-
rocal trade agreements act, the President argued he could negotiate a
reciprocal trade agreement without further reference to Congress.
Thus, the Executive's plan to negotiate GATT without referring it to
Congress was in danger because of references in it to an orgnization.
The negotiators returned to Geneva and erased all of the words
that said organization and substituted the words "contracting parties
acting jointly." That is the phrase that you see in that agreement to-
day. So, in theory, the GATT was not an organization.
Today, you will hear the statement that GATT is not a legally
binding obligation of the United States. I disagree because the 1945
Extension Act did support what the president did as long as it was not,
at that time, an organization. You may also hear it stated that GATT
is not an organization. Well that is taxonomy. Look at what the GATT
is, what it is doing, and how it goes about its work and I say this is an
organization.
The GATT today is not what it was intended to be. It has had to
move in and fill a vacuum because the ITO Charter was never ap-
proved by Congress. The proposed ITO charter was finished at a meet-
ing in Havana in 1948, a presidential election year. Surprisingly, Harry
Truman was elected, but he had a Republican congress with which to
deal. So it was a Democratic president submitting the ITO Charter to
a Republican congress. The mood of the nation was to return to nor-
malcy, time to turn inward a little bit, to leave the war behind. All of
these things were operating and in 1951 the U.S. negotiators realized
that the charter would not be approved and that no other country in
the world would enter into the GATT if the United States was not in
it.
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Recall that I said the GATT is not in force. In fact, it is not.
There was an interesting lawyer diplomatic problem. In the Fall of
1947, at the end of the Geneva Conference, the drafting of the GATT
was finished, but the drafting of the ITO Charter was not. Drafting the
Charter would be continued at the Havana Conference in 1948.
The U.S. Executive Department wanted to get the GATT into
force right away. First of all, they thought, GATT cannot be kept a
secret very long. As soon as some of the tariff concessions that made
would begin to leak out into the business world, businessmen would
react accordingly. This in turn would distort world trade patterns. The
Executive Department felt that it was important to get the GATT into
effect immediately if it was to be done at all. Secondly, the Executive
Department's authority to bring GATT into effect without going to
Congress would expire in the middle of 1948.
Other countries disagreed stating that they could not implement
the GATT at that time. Under their executive authority they would
have to take the proposed GATT back to their parliaments. And next
year, after the ITO Charter was finished, they would again need to take
that to their parliaments. These countries did not want to go to their
parliaments with the GATT, spend political chips, twist arms, convince
the parliament to go along and then six, eight or twelve months later,
come back with another agreement that has similar problems and re-
peat the process and run the risk of losing the second time around.
These nations wanted to implement the GATT and the Charter all at
one time, at a later point.
The solution was the Protocol of Provisional Application. It is this
Protocol that has put GATT into effect as an international legal norm.
The Protocol had some important differences from GATT itself. The
most important difference relates to in Part Two of the GATT, which
is the code of conduct that includes measures of national treatment,
anti-dumping, countervailing duty, measures of subsidies, state trading,
and quantitative restrictions. According to the Protocol those clauses in
GATT would be implemented only to the extent not inconsistent with
prior legislation. And this is the source of the so-called "grandfather
rights" in GATT, a problem that has existed all through the history of
GATT. At the time, it was thought that the Protocol Provisional Appli-
cation would drop away in two or three years, because the ITO would
come into effect and then countries would definitively accept GATT. In
actual fact we are today, still provisionally applying the GATT under
that Protocol and so it is subject to these other clauses.
III.
Before I conclude I will turn to some of the other interesting
1987]
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points involving the GATT. I begin with an intriguing lawyer's ques-
tion. Is the GATT law in the United States? Is it law anywhere? First
of all, of course, it is international law. It is an international legal norm
but in many countries of the world an international legal norm is differ-
ent from a domestic legal norm. That is certainly true in the United
States. It is quite possible for the United States to have a domestic
legal norm that violates its valid international obligations. The Courts
of the United States and its domestic jurisprudence must follow the
laws of the United States, including the Constitution of the United
States. If the GATT, for instance, were invalid under the U.S. Consti-
tution and yet had been validly entered into under international cus-
tomary or conventional rules, we might have found ourselves in conflict.
However, that is not the question because the GATT has been validly
entered into. It remains to be asked whether the provisions of the
GATT are part of the law of the United States.
Even though the GATT itself might be termed a self-executing
treaty, and indeed there is preparatory work that suggest the draftsmen
thought it was, the Protocol of Provisional Application is almost cer-
tainly not self-executing. Remember that two-part power I mentioned
that was given to the president. The second part of that power was to
proclaim the results of an agreement into U.S. Law and indeed the
President has proclaimed the GATT into U.S. law, all except one part.
Thus for most purposes, the GATT is domestic U.S. law.
Every court case that I can find that has ruled on the issue has
held the GATT to be validly binding on individual citizens or on states.
The GATT agreement, if you include the whole GATT agreement, is
about forty volumes. It consists of this little document that we often
call the "GATT agreement", plus Article II of GATT integrates into
the GATT the schedules of tariff concessions and there are now about
forty volumes of item by item tariff concessions that have become part
of the treaty of GATT. The schedule for the United States is one vol-
ume itself. It lists thousands and thousands of products and detailed
product descriptions and beside each of them is a tariff rate, which is
"binding." For instance, beside bicycles it might say "five percent" and
that means that the United States cannot charge more than a five per-
cent tariff under the GATT.
Also interesting are some of the other agreements associated with
GATT. There have been a series of seven trade rounds in the GATT.
In each round the members of GATT and usually some other govern-
ments who intended to join GATT, gathered together and negotiated.
In the early rounds they negotiated almost solely on reduction of tar-
iffs. From 1962 to 1967, in the sixth round, the Kennedy round, there
was a first attempt to look at non-tariff barriers. The seventh round, the
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Tokyo Round, from 1973 to 1979, was the largest by far; it probably
tripled the competence and the work of GATT.
For a variety of reasons, it is generally believed, that you cannot
amend the GATT agreement because the politics are just too difficult.
The treaty provisions that allow amendment call for two-thirds vote,
the amendment will not apply to an abstainer, and some parts of the
GATT require an unanimous vote.
However, while the negotiators feel that the GATT cannot be
amended they also feel that subjects like subsidies are inadequately
treated in the GATT. The solution was to negotiate a "side code", a
separate treaty which was opened for signature to those nations who
wish to participate. This was done with one agreement in the Kennedy
Round called the Anti-Dumping Code, and it was done with about ten
agreements in the Tokyo Round, a whole series of codes. Each of those
codes stands alone as a treaty. The effect of those agreements in United
States law is quite different than the GATT itself. Congress has never
given advance authority to the president for a non-tariff barrier agree-
ment because non-tariff barriers are too complex and they cover a lot
of subjects that the Congress has struggled with for decades, like envi-
ronmental protection laws, and tax laws, and so on. Instead, we
designed in the 1974 Trade Act, something called the Fast Track Pro-
cedure which requires the President to negotiate the codes and then
submit the results to the Congress. And the President did just that in
the 1979 Trade Agreements Act. Additionally, Congress has decided
not to permit those international agreements to be self-executing.
Rather, Congress incorporated the language of those codes into the
Trade Act of 1979. Congress did not necessarily use all of the original
language, and in some cases Congress added language of its own. At
times the congressional language went beyond what the international
obligations required. Hence, legally there is a bit of tension now as to
how you handle some of these codes. And therein lies one of the
problems, I think, for improving the international dispute settlement
process.
IV.
In the time permitted I have only been able to scratch the surface
of what is obviously a vast and complicated subject. I think one of the
remarkable facts of post-World War II economic life, is the reasonable
success which can be attributed to the GATT and the other interna-
tional economic institutions during the past four decades. This success
is certainly more than anyone had the right to predict during the six or
seven years of formation of the GATT.
Yet today we are facing conditions that are extremely different
19871
12 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE [Vol. I I
and orders of magnitude more difficult than those for which the GATT
was designed to face. Economic interdependence has become so
profound, that billions of dollars move between nations with the flick of
a computer key. Economic influences or disturbances, greased by the
dramatic drop in transportation and transaction costs, but assisted by
the GATT and other international institutions which have reduced the
governmental barriers to economic transactions, now flow rapidly
across borders, much to the frustration of government leaders who find
matters largely out of their control.
All this raises the question whether the institutions of the GATT
and the Bretton Woods system are adequate for the next decades. The
Punta del Este meeting launched a major trade negotiation which is
likely to be the last chance in this century to work constructively for
the improvement of these institutions. The results will undoubtedly lay
the groundwork for the first several decades of international economic
life in the next century. In short, it is a crucial time for international
policy. The Punta del Este meeting has resulted in a good "launch."
Let us hope that the ensuing activities of the process begun there will
prove to be equally constructive.
